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PUNISHMENT IN THE STATE OF NATURE: 
JOHN LOCKE AND CRIMINAL PUNISHMENT IN 
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA  
MATTHEW K. SUESS

  
INTRODUCTION 
The criminal justice system in the United States of America has been 
widely criticized for having the highest rate of incarceration in the world. 
Compounding this problem is a high rate of recidivism across both state 
and federal jurisdictions. There is, then, a fundamental flaw in the nature 
of criminal punishment in the United States; namely that the criminal 
justice system lacks an adequate mechanism for discouraging future 
criminal activity. This is unacceptable for the bastion of modern 
democracy. American policymakers must begin to think critically about 
the nature and purpose of punishment in order to realize a more efficient 
criminal justice system. 
One possible starting point for a substantive discussion regarding the 
nature and purpose of punishment is the political philosophy of John 
Locke. In his seminal work, Two Treatises of Government, Locke outlined 
a detailed state of human interaction prior to the invention of formal 
government. Within his theory of the “state of nature,” Locke 
contemplated the manner in which individuals, completely lacking 
sociopolitical constructs, might punish malfeasors. By deconstructing the 
ingrained system of punishment, Locke was able to sketch a system based 
on individual freedom and equality. 
This Note will proceed in three parts. In Part I, this Article will present 
the theory of punishment outlined in John Locke’s major work on political 
philosophy, Two Treatises of Government. Part I will focus on the 
theoretical justification for punishment among perfectly free and equal 
individuals. Part II, will analyze the shortcomings of the criminal justice 
system in the United States. Special attention will be paid to the current 
percentage of inmates convicted of victimless crimes. Finally, Part III of 
this Note will apply the Lockean theory of punishment enumerated in Part 
I to the problems facing the American criminal justice system outlined in 
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Part II. This part of the Note will propose substantive—though not 
exhaustive—changes that could help reverse the high rate of incarceration 
in the United States and the social problems stemming therefrom.  
I. JOHN LOCKE AND PUNISHMENT IN THE STATE OF NATURE 
The political philosophy of John Locke provides a legitimate starting 
place for substantive discussion of criminal punishment in the United 
States. Legislators would be justified in looking to Locke because of the 
significant tie between his political philosophy and the American 
revolutionaries’ conception of the relationship between the individual and 
government.
1
 Importantly, this influence was not limited to a single 
political group.
2
 This shows not only that Enlightenment political 
philosophy had reached the thirteen North American colonies, but also that 
such ideas were widely disseminated and accepted.
3
 Among 
Enlightenment philosophers, John Locke was particularly instrumental in 
forming the animus of American political theory.
4
 
A. Locke and the English Civil War 
The upheaval following the English Civil War was a formative 
experience in the life and philosophy of John Locke.
5
 England, during the 
period immediately preceding the outbreak of war, experienced a 
pronounced shift toward a continental-style royal absolutism.
6
 “Such 
 
 
 1. “Lockean theory was actually understood in considerable detail, at least by certain important 
revolutionary figures.” Joshua Foa Dienstag, Between History and Nature: Social Contract Theory in 
Locke and the Founders, 58 J. POL. 985, 986 (1996). 
 2. Their political differences notwithstanding, “Jefferson and Adams both regularly used 
[Lockean theories] in their political papers from early in their careers.” Id. at 993. 
 3. “A survey of American resistance pamphlets reveals that Lockean themes were very common 
and that for a number of reasons writers were able to see Lockean arguments as complementary to 
[other arguments in favor of independence].” Alex Tuckness, Discourses of Resistance in the 
American Revolution, 64 J. HIST. IDEAS 547 (2003). Further, “[e]ven as a lawyer in colonial Virginia, 
Jefferson appealed to such positions, assuming, no doubt, that they were the prevailing views of the 
day.” Dienstag, supra note 1, at 993. 
 4. “Many go so far as to suggest his influence upon the American Founding Fathers was so 
great that the United States may be termed a Lockean nation.” GEORGE MACE, LOCKE, HOBBES, AND 
THE FEDERALIST PAPERS: AN ESSAY ON THE GENESIS OF THE AMERICAN POLITICAL HERITAGE 9 
(1979). 
 5. “Born in 1632, ten years before the Civil War broke out, a young man during the 
Commonwealth, exiled in Holland during the reign of the restored King Charles II—returning to 
England with William III—John Locke lived through a turbulent period of history.” M.V.C. Jeffreys, 
John Locke, 4 BRIT. MED. J. 34 (1974). 
 6. “The Anglican canons of 1640, summarizing the trend toward royal absolutism in Stuart 
England, declared that monarchical power was ‘the ordinance of God himself, founded in the prime 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_jurisprudence/vol7/iss2/9
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claims of irresistible authority provoked anxiety in a public already 
alarmed by the erosion of safeguards against arbitrary government and the 
inroads of a power not only despotic but plausibly demonic in character 
. . . .”7 England dissolved into civil war in the 1640s, then, to protect 
constitutional rights against royal aggression.
8
 However, this concern for 
rights was not limited to individual liberties, but also related to a societal 
need to reinforce the relationship between a limited monarchy and free 
men.
9
 
As an internal conflict of an ideological and religious nature, the 
English Civil War brought widespread violence.
10
 During this conflict, the 
“borderline between the legitimate and illegitimate was often unclear.”11 
Contemporaries understood the possibility of English society unraveling in 
chaos.
12
 Indeed, “[s]oldiers and civilians alike sought to contain the forces 
of social disruption and chaos that seemed always to menace the thin skin 
of ordered society and in war threatened to burst free.”13 
The English Civil War ended with the trial of Charles I for charges of 
tyranny.
14
 The trial contained “arguments about law, authority, and 
 
 
Laws of nature, and clearly established by expresse texts both of the old and new Testaments.’ It 
followed that such power, divine in both institution and function, was not to be defied.” Robert Zaller, 
The Figure of the Tyrant in English Revolutionary Thought, 54 J. HIST. IDEAS 585 (1993). 
 7. Id. at 585−86. 
 8. Johann P. Sommerville, English and European Political Ideas in the Early Seventeenth 
Century: Revisionism and the Case of Absolutism, 35 J. BRIT. STUD. 168 (1996).  
 9. “When critics of the crown in the early 1640s stress the need to restore and uphold the 
freedom of their fellow subjects, they are not speaking merely or even mainly about the need to 
prevent their individual rights and liberties from being oppressed and curtailed. They are speaking 
about the need to rescue the free-born people of England from the loss of their standing as free-men. 
They are speaking, as they liked to proclaim, about the need to free the entire nation from its unjust 
condition of bondage and servitude.” Quentin Skinner, Rethinking Political Liberty, 61 HIST. 
WORKSHOP J. 156, 160 (2006). 
 10. “England did not lack atrocities—Abbotsbury, Barthonley, Hopton Castle and Naseby are 
random examples that exhibited greater ferocity than Lostwithiel . . . with victims number in the tens 
and hundreds.” Barbara Donagan, Codes of Conduct in the English Civil War, 118 PAST & PRESENT 
65, 94 (1988). 
 11. Id. at 80. 
 12. “[T]he father sending his bullet at a venture, may kill his sonne, or the sonne his father; this 
is probable enough: but it is impossible, that brothers, kindred and friends should not mingle in one 
anothers blood, (and, perhaps, purposely) wee see such an eager division in all Families. And it is so 
universall, that no Countie, scarce any Citie or Corporation is so unanimous, but they have division 
enough to undoe themselves. And it is evident enough, that . . . wee shall be quite torne in pieces.” Id. 
at 65 (quoting The Moderator Expecting Sudden Peace or Certain Ruine (London: 1642), at 11).  
 13. Barbara Donagan, Atrocity, War Crime, and Treason in the English Civil War, 99 AM. HIST. 
REV. 1137, 1138 (1994). 
 14. “[T]he King was arraigned at his trial in the secular garb of the tyrant. ‘Tyranny’ was indeed 
the essence of the charge against him; for of the four counts of the indictment, that he was ‘a tyrant, 
traitor, murderer, and a public and implacable enemy to the Commonwealth of England,’ the latter 
three were comprehended in the first.” Zaller, supra note 6, at 600.  
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political right [that] seemed . . . to have defined the very nature of the 
struggle between the king and his subjects, perhaps even to have marked a 
crucial turning point in the history of democracy and freedom.”15 A 
reclusive personality, Charles I bore a great deal of blame for allowing the 
nation to spiral into conflict.
16
 The trial itself, however, proceeded 
according to the rule of law.
17
 There is little evidence that the trial of 
Charles I was mere formality.
18
 In fact, it appeared that the tribunal 
desperately attempted to avoid regicide.
19
 However, the result of the trial 
 
 
 15. Sean Kelsey, Politics and Procedure in the Trial of Charles I, 22 LAW & HIST. REV. 1, 2 
(2004).  
 16. “Charles I was not a ‘great and glorious king.’ He failed in all his primary responsibilities, 
and some part of those failures must be attributed to conscious decisions he made and personality traits 
he possessed. He inherited a monarchy filled with challenges and he failed to meet them.” Mark 
Kishlansky, Charles I: A Case of Mistaken Identity, 189 PAST & PRESENT 41, 48 (2005).  
 Among his critics, there were those “who wanted to dredge the record of the king’s reign to the 
very depths, accusing him of complicity in his own father’s murder, dragging up the mismanagement 
of the expedition to La Rochelle, before even broaching the subject of the Irish rebellion and the 
subsequent civil wars in England.” Kelsey, supra note 15, at 14.  
 17. “[R]ecent studies have shown that the commissioners responsible for conducting the most 
remarkable show-trial in English history made every effort to give an impression of following due 
process in the execution of their commission. In spite of the crescendo of demands for vengeance and 
the expiation of blood guilt during the autumn and winter of 1648–49, ‘the desire that Charles should 
be brought to justice meant that there was an attempt to judge him within a legal framework.’” Kelsey, 
supra note 15, at 2 (citing Patricia Crawford, Charles Stuart, That Man of Blood, 16 J. BRIT. STUD. 58 
(1977).  
 After the conclusion of the trial, it became apparent that “it was adherence to the conventions of 
English legal process that had enabled many of the commissioners for the trial of Charles I to see out 
their awful responsibilities right to the bitter end.” Kelsey, supra note 15, at 25. 
 18. “Firm evidence that the trial was envisaged simply as a means to the end of regicide is 
extremely thin. Conversely, there are substantial grounds for believing that a trial need not have ended 
in king-killing at all.” Id. at 4.  
 Further, if “the king could demonstrate that he himself was not guilty of prosecuting war for 
selfish ends, or else ‘that Parliament or any particular party in the Kindome have raysed or continued 
the warre for private interests of their owne . . . let him then be acquitted in Judgment, and the Guilt 
and Blame be laid where else it is due.’ Far from simply presenting an indictment of the king’s actions, 
the charges against him were virtually an invitation to Charles to point the finger at the real guilty 
parties.” Id. at 15. 
 19. “Members of that tribunal did everything possible to restrict the terrible dangers inherent in 
placing the king on trial for treason, tyranny, and murder. A majority among the trial commissioners 
ensured that the charge against him was drawn as narrowly as absolutely possible, tailoring it to fit the 
weakest imaginable evidence for his ‘crimes.’ They thus tied the hands of the prosecution counsel in 
an effort to restrain those more inclined to exact the highest price from Charles for the suffering of the 
1640s. But there was really only so much they could do. Their eventual failure lay in failing to 
persuade Charles to take the last chances he was repeatedly offered in what would turn out to be the 
last few days of his life. In the course of four separate sessions of the High Court of Justice, the king 
had been offered at least nine distinct opportunities to plead to the charges against him—a clear 
indication of just how desperate most of his judges were to avoid king-killing, the action most likely to 
wreck England’s ancient constitution. But the king’s obstinate refusal to cooperate with his judges 
robbed the moderates of the initiative.” Id. at 24–25. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_jurisprudence/vol7/iss2/9
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was unprecedented: the “execution of a reigning monarch, Charles I, and 
the abolition of monarchy in England.”20  
This episode of English history has been called “perhaps the most 
daring action any Body of Men to be met with in History ever, with clear 
consciousness, deliberately set themselves to do.”21 In any event, the civil 
war “gave shape to two decades of exhausting ferment that fundamentally 
altered the politics and culture of the English-speaking world.”22 It was 
this period that shaped the political philosophy of John Locke.
23
 The 
American revolutionaries found Locke’s experience and analysis 
particularly informative as they engaged in what began as another civil 
war among Englishmen for the protection of constitutional rights.
24
 In fact, 
many American revolutionaries thought of themselves as the ideological 
heirs to the anti-royalist forces of the English Civil War.
25
 Therefore, 
Locke’s influence in colonial America stemmed, in part, from his similar 
experience of government. It was this experience that resulted in his 
justification for the right of resistance found in Two Treatises of 
Government.
26
   
 
 
 20. Zaller, supra note 6, at 586. 
 21. Robert Zaller, What Does the English Revolution Mean? Recent Historigraphical 
Interpretations of Mid-Seventeenth Century England, 18 ALBION: A Q. J. CONCERNED WITH BRIT. 
STUD. 617, 631 (1986). 
 22. David Cressy, Revolutionary England 1640–1642, 181 PAST & PRESENT 35, 37 (2003). 
 23. “Locke’s writings and activities are firmly enmeshed in the anti-feudal character of the 
English Civil War and its aftermath.” John F. Henry, John Locke, Property Rights, and Economic 
Theory, 33 J. ECON. ISSUES 609, 613 (1999). 
 24. The American colonists viewed themselves as British with the rights under the British 
constitution. “At the same time that the English began expanding beyond the realm to create what 
became known as an empire, they also innovated upon old scripts of fundamental law to define their 
national constitution—to define the English nation. Constitutional ideas and imperial expansion 
developed simultaneously and reciprocally.” Daniel J. Hulsebosch, The Ancient Constitution and the 
Expanding Empire: Sir Edward Coke’s British Jurisprudence, 21 L. & HIST. REV. 439, 443 (2003). 
 25. “Patriots at the beginning of the American Revolution were conscious of participating in a 
tradition of liberty derived from their Puritan forefathers. Not only did they refer back to the crossing 
of the sea by their ancestors who ‘bravely threw themselves upon the bosom of the ocean, determined 
to find a place in which they might enjoy their freedom, or perish in the glorious attempt,’ but they 
also spoke of themselves as ‘the descendants of Oliver Cromwell’s army,’ ‘the descendants of 
Cromwell’s elect.’” James C. Spalding, Loyalist as Royalist, Patriot as Puritan: The American 
Revolution as a Repetition of the English Civil Wars, 45 CHURCH HIST. 329 (1976). 
 26. “As an authority for the American Founders [Locke] stands at the source of [their] tradition. 
But he was an authority for those revolutionaries because his political teaching culminates in the last 
chapter of the Second Treatise, a defense of the right of resistance.” Nathan Tarcov, Locke’s Second 
Treatise and ‘The Best Fence against Rebellion,’ 43 REV. POL. 198 (1981). 
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B. The Lockean State of Nature 
It was in Two Treatises of Government that Locke described his state of 
nature.
27
 The state of nature was a philosophical construct frequently used 
by Enlightenment political philosophers, including Thomas Hobbes, John 
Locke, and Jean-Jacques Rousseau.
28
 In essence, the state of nature 
hypothesized social interaction before the advent of government. The term 
“state of nature” appears to “derive from late scholasticism, where it [was] 
a name for the human condition prior to the Fall.”29 However, the notion 
did not gain notoriety until its popular use in Enlightenment political 
philosophy.
30
 
The state of nature is “not so much a historical condition that men 
dwelt in at some time in the past as it is—to use Hobbes’s helpful 
expression—an ‘Inference, made from the Passions.’”31 Instead of an 
anthropological reality, the state of nature was conceived of through the 
recognition that communal government was a manmade innovation.
32
 
 
 
 27. “The state of nature is, of course, that state in which prepolitical man existed, but it is also the 
state into which each of us is born today, and in which we remain until we consent to join some 
commonwealth. It is the state to which we return when our political society dissolves (as in times of 
civil war), and perhaps also when our political leaders overstep the bounds of their rightful authority 
(i.e., cases of tyranny). It is the state in which all political rulers stand with respect to one another, and 
in which all citizens of one state stand with respect to citizens of another state.” A. John Simmons, 
Locke and the Right to Punish, 20 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 311, 319 (1991). 
 28. Jean-Jacques Rousseau first published Discourse on the Origin and Basis of Inequality 
Among Men in 1754. Leviathan, by Thomas Hobbes, was published in 1651. And the major work 
discussed in this paper, Two Treatises of Government, by Locke, was published in 1689. All three 
works, containing substantial discussions of the state of nature and the relationship between citizen and 
government, were available to the colonists in North America prior to the American Revolutionary 
War.  
 In addition, the state of nature has appeared in the works of other influential thinkers such as 
Thomas Aquinas, Montesquieu, and David Hume. The state of nature has also appeared more recently 
in the work John Rawls and Robert Nozick. 
 29. THOMAS L. PANGLE, THE SPIRIT OF MODERN REPUBLICANISM: THE MORAL VISION OF THE 
AMERICAN FOUNDERS AND THE PHILOSOPHY OF LOCKE 131 (1988). 
 30. “The notion suddenly skyrocketed to importance through the impact of Thomas Hobbes, who 
took the term over and radically transformed its meaning so as to make it the core of an unprecedented 
doctrine of natural rights . . . [b]ut it took Locke’s ameliorations to create . . . something acceptable to 
the great body of decent opinion—and something not only acceptable but overwhelming it its appeal.” 
Id. 
 31. Id. at 246. 
 32. “[T]he idea [of the state of nature] reveals a latent reality, a set of diverse possibilities, that 
lies just beneath the surface of all civil existence.” Id. Though there is no concrete evidence of how the 
state of nature actually functioned, human reason can conclude that there was necessarily a moment in 
time, after man developed self-awareness, and before men settled into societies, that there was an 
actual state of nature. 
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However, the fact that the state of nature was, at least in part, a fiction, did 
not minimize its utility as a philosophical construct.
33
  
John Locke outlined his conception of the state of nature in Book II of 
Two Treatises of Government.
34
 The major distinguishing feature of 
Locke’s state of nature is almost uninhibited personal freedom.35 Because 
of this freedom, the state of nature is a “state also of equality, wherein all 
the power and jurisdiction is reciprocal, no one having more than 
another.”36 
This freedom and equality distinguished Locke from his 
contemporaries, especially Thomas Hobbes. Rather than focusing on 
individual liberty, Hobbes believed that nothing was more capable of 
safeguarding civil peace than an absolute power.
37
 Unlike Hobbes, Locke 
believed that “the state of nature need not be warlike, and that, in 
following the command of natural law which urges [men] to preserve 
[themselves] and to do ‘all reasonable things’ [they] can to preserve 
mankind, [men] are not automatically brought into conflict with others.”38  
The fundamental difference between these two Englishmen stemmed 
from starkly divergent experience.
39
 To Hobbes, government is justifiable 
 
 
 33. “’[T]is utterly impossible for men to remain any considerable time in that savage condition, 
which precedes society; but that his very first state and situation may justly be esteem’d social. This, 
however, hinders not, but that philosophers may, if they please, extend their reasoning to the suppos’d 
state of nature; provided they allow it to be a mere philosophical fiction, which never had, and never 
cou’d have any reality.” DAVID HUME, A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE 493 (L.A. Selby-Bigge ed., 
2d ed., Oxford University Press) (1888).  
 34. See generally JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT (Ian Shapiro ed., Yale 
University Press 2003) (1689). 
 35. “To understand political power right, and derive it from its original, we must consider what 
state all men are naturally in, and that is a state of perfect freedom to order their actions and dispose of 
their possessions and persons as they think fit, within the bounds of the law of nature, without asking 
leave or depending upon the will of any other man.” Id. at 101. 
 36. Id. Further, “[t]here being nothing more evident than that creatures of the same species and 
rank, promiscuously born to all the same advantages of nature, and the use of the same faculties, 
should also be equal one amongst another without subordination or subjection; unless the lord and 
master of them all should, by any manifest declaration of his will, set one above another, and confer on 
him by an evident and clear appointment an undoubted right to dominion and sovereignty.” Id. 
 37. Patrick Coby, The Law of Nature in Locke’s Second Treatise: Is Locke a Hobbesian?, 49 
REV. POL. 3, 5 (1987). 
 38. Richard Ashcraft, Locke’s State of Nature: Historical Fact or Moral Fiction?, 62 AM. POL. 
SCI. REV. 898, 903 (1968) (emphasis in original). 
 39. The conflicting opinions of Hobbes and Locke can be loosely tied to the state of 
contemporary English politics during the lifetimes of these two philosophers. Separated by a mere 
generation, Hobbes witnessed firsthand the execution of a divinely-appointed monarch and the 
devastation of England in civil war. In particular, Hobbes believed that man was competitive and 
afraid in the state of nature and required the institution of government, and its intervention, to provide 
protection and structure to an otherwise difficult, even miserable, existence.  
 John Locke, on the other hand, witnessed the sovereign people of England select their own 
monarch and religion during the Glorious Revolution. He believed much more in self-determination 
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because it better preserves human life than people themselves can attain in 
the state of nature.
40
 The paramount difference between the theories of 
Locke and Hobbes is that “Hobbes asks mainly that civil society be the 
strong guardian of men’s lives; Locke asks also that civil society be the 
fountainhead of justice.”41  
In Locke’s view, the main purpose of government is to protect the 
inherent rights of individuals. Every man has, by birth, certain inherent 
and inalienable rights: life, health, liberty, and property.
42
 Freedom, 
therefore, goes beyond an individual’s right to act according to his own 
volition, and likewise, includes the right to acquire, and dispose of, 
property. 
In Locke’s view, “the right to property is natural, or precontractual; it 
antedates not only civil society but also other types of social 
arrangements.”43 There were two ways in which man could exert 
ownership over property. The first is tied directly to the right to life: a man 
can make use of objects in nature necessary for self-preservation.
44
 In 
other words, “[o]ne may appropriate as much property as one can use 
before it spoils.”45 
The second way in which an individual could exert ownership over an 
object is through labor. In Locke’s view, objects exist only for mankind’s 
use.
46
 “However, in their natural state most things are not particularly 
useful or valuable, and they must be improved by man before they can be 
an object of use.”47 Men were allowed, then, to exert ownership over 
 
 
and positive political choice. These drastically different experiences undoubtedly had a significant 
effect on the political philosophies of Thomas Hobbes and John Locke and, in particular, their 
divergent conceptions of the state of nature. 
 40. Corey Brettschneider, The Rights of the Guilty: Punishment and Political Legitimacy, 35 
POL. THEORY 175, 180 (2007). 
 41. Coby, supra note 37, at 16. 
 42. The first three rights—to life, health and liberty—can be traced directly to Locke’s belief in 
the absolute right to self-preservation. The fourth right, to property, is also founded on the theory of 
preservation, as men have a right to “meat and drink, and such other things, as nature affords for their 
subsistence.” LOCKE, supra note 34, at 111. 
 43. David C. Snyder, Locke on Natural Law and Property Rights, 16 CANADIAN J. PHIL. 723, 
726 (1986). 
 44. “[P]reservation demands that persons use objects, but to use them they must first appropriate 
them, must own them.” Id. at 735.  
 45. E. Clinton Gardner, John Locke: Justice and the Social Compact, 9 J.L. & RELIGION 347, 
355 (1992).  
 46. “Locke argued that everything on earth is put here for man’s use. Things do not exist for 
themselves but are always and only for man.” Snyder, supra note 43, at 737.  
 47. Id.  
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property in Locke’s state of nature because labor changes the very nature 
of a good, transforming it into something useful.
48
 
C. The Law of Nature 
The only limitation on individual prerogative in the state of nature, 
whether concerning an individual’s person or possessions, was the law of 
nature.
49
 This, too, is an area of stark contrast between Hobbes and 
Locke.
50
 Locke gives no systematic description of the law of nature in Two 
Treatises of Government.
51
 Even without such a description, Locke 
outlined at least six laws functioning in the state of nature.
52
 These six 
laws correspond to three relationships: the individual to the community, 
the individual to property, and the parents to children.
53
  
Each of these laws, then, concerned the life, health, liberty, or property 
of equally free individuals within the state of nature. In Locke’s own 
language, “[t]he state of nature has a law of nature to govern it, which 
obliges every one . . . that being all equal and independent, no one ought to 
 
 
 48. “Locke’s . . . response to the question of why one’s labor marks off an object as one’s own is 
found in several passages. In one he says that a man owns his labor, and whatever he mixes that labor 
with is properly his. In another he claims that labor adds value to a thing . . . . And in yet another he 
tells us that if anyone other than the laborer desires to ‘meddle with’ an object improved by that labor, 
he desires, ‘the benefit of another’s Pains, which he had no right to.’” Id. at 736 (internal citations 
omitted). 
 49. “Locke’s theory of natural law is basically a continuation of the traditional conceptions of 
natural law deriving from the classics and continuing through medieval scholasticism and the 
Reformation. . . . Essentially, the law of nature for Locke is the same universal law of reason valid for 
all men because of their human nature, which can be traced from the Stoics, through the Roman 
lawyers, the Christian era, the school of Naturrecht, and ultimately through ‘the judicious’ Hooker.” 
James O. Hancey, John Locke and the Law of Nature, 4 POL. THEORY 439−40 (1976) (internal 
citations omitted).  
 50. “Hobbes does not differentiate, as does Locke, between natural laws appropriate to a state of 
nature and natural laws appropriate to civil society. He does not because he denies that the state of 
nature is actually governed by natural law. For Hobbes, natural law has the sole function of effecting 
man’s progress from nature to society, which progress is accomplished by socializing an otherwise 
unsocial creature and by establishing elemental rules of fair treatment.” Coby, supra note 37, at 5. 
“Hobbes and Locke are evidently at opposite poles, with Hobbes using natural law to defend 
absolutism and Locke using natural law to promote limited government.” Id.  
 51. “It is a much remarked fact about Locke that he gives no systematic account of natural law in 
the Second Treatise.” Id. at 4. 
 52. “[O]ne discovers at least thirteen natural laws in total and as many as six functioning in the 
state of nature.” Id. 
 53. “Those which exist prior to and independent of civil society are: (1) self-preservation; (2) the 
preservation of mankind; (3) private property; (4) restrictions on private acquisition, namely the 
requirements that nothing appropriated be allowed to spoil and that there be ‘enough, and as good left’ 
for others; (5) parents’ care of children; and (6) children’s care, defense, comfort, and honor of 
parents.” Id. (internal citations omitted).  
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harm another in his life, health, liberty, or possessions.”54 For Locke, 
natural law was an inherent part of human existence in the state of 
nature.
55
  
Some commentators have argued that the entire notion of law is 
contradictory to the very premise of the state of nature.
56
 However, this 
contention is misplaced, for while Locke did not invent the law of nature, 
his conception of the law differed from tradition in one major way: the 
means by which it came to be known.
57
 Locke believed “the law of nature 
. . . is not known through inscription or handed down by tradition but is 
known by reason through sense experience.”58 Rather, “[s]elf-evident 
truths are self-evident not because they are innately impressed upon the 
mind but because it is impossible to believe to the contrary.”59 
It is not inconsistent, either, for Locke to contend that innate 
knowledge is a fiction while maintaining that there are certain self-evident 
principles.
60
 It is not the truths themselves, but the ability to discover 
them, through the use of human reason, that is innate.
61
 Locke contended 
“something can be known by the light of nature . . . that there is some sort 
of truth to the knowledge of which a man can attain by himself and 
without the help of another, if he makes proper use of the faculties he is 
endowed with by nature.”62 In other words, “if man makes use properly of 
his reason and of the inborn faculties with which nature has equipped him, 
 
 
 54. LOCKE, supra note 34, at 102. 
 55. “[L]aw exists within the framework of nature. It exists because man exists. As soon as there 
is man, there is law, that which orders and restricts and that which, through such ordering, brings about 
societal institutions that will allow and enable man to attain his ‘true’ end, his right or best life.” 
MACE, supra note 4, at 4. 
 56. The commentators raise an interesting concern. Law is, generally, handed down from one 
generation to the next. This understanding relegates law to the status of a social construct, a sort of 
communal contract to act in accordance with the general will. This is the very construct that the state 
of nature attempts to dismiss. As such, some, including Rousseau, believe that law is outside of the 
state of nature. 
 57. “Locke’s most innovative deviation from the traditional conception of the law of nature was 
his assertion that the tenets of natural law were capable of demonstration, and that all who would use 
their God-given faculties of sense-perception and reason could attain a knowledge of that law.” 
Hancey, supra note 49, at 441. 
 58. John W. Yolton, Locke on the Law of Nature, 67 PHIL. REV. 477, 482 (1958). 
 59. Snyder, supra note 43, at 727. 
 60. “Although Locke argues that we do not have truths imprinted upon our minds from birth—
indeed, he rejects the claim that we do as not merely false, but nonsensical—he never says that we 
have no innate capacity of reason or that there are no principles discoverable by the understanding 
alone.” Id. 
 61. “It is not inconsistent for Locke to hold on the one hand that the notion of innate knowledge 
is a myth and on the other that there are self-evident principles to which the rational man will readily 
assent, for it is the ability to discover these truths, not the truths themselves, that is innate.” Id. at 728. 
 62. JOHN LOCKE, ESSAYS ON THE LAW OF NATURE 123 (W. von Leyden ed., Oxford University 
Press 1954) (1676). 
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he can attain to the knowledge of this law without any teacher instructing 
him in his duties.”63 Instead of a social construct, the law of nature is, then, 
“an objective moral rule . . . it is both eternal and universal.”64 
Reason obliges men, therefore, to adhere to the law of nature.
65
 Were 
all men perfectly rational—that is, entirely obedient to the law of nature—
there would be no need to discuss punishment.
66
 Locke’s contention that 
man is endowed with free will means, however, that the law of nature, 
though known by reason, is not necessarily universally obeyed. “In the 
state of nature, a state of freedom, it is possible for men to behave both 
well and badly.”67 The very freedom requisite to a Lockean state of nature 
implies that there will be individuals who choose to act outside of the 
boundaries of the law.
68
 “But because such individuals do exist, and 
because Locke seemingly realizes that similar tendencies tempt all men at 
least occasionally, to uphold natural law . . . the rational man has the right 
to punish criminals. For if no one had such a right the law of nature would 
be in vain.”69 
D. Basis for Punishment in the Lockean State of Nature 
Punishment, as a term, is understood well enough that an extended 
discussion is not necessary.
70
 The existence of law, coupled with the 
existence of free will, encourages communities to devise systems of 
 
 
 63. Id. at 127. 
 64. Gardner, supra note 45, at 349. 
 65. “Reason can oblige man, not simply to preserve himself—for this is instinctual—but to 
preserve himself in a way consistent with reason; and rational self-preservation may commonly entail 
the preservation of others, since to threaten others needlessly is to introduce into one’s surroundings 
the distrust and ill-will that make abandonment of the state of nature and the surrender of natural rights 
inevitable.” Coby, supra note 37, at 8. 
 66. “Were all men perfectly rational, that is, perfectly obedient to natural law, government would 
have no cause to exist.” Id. As the purpose of government, according to Locke, is to enforce the law, if 
man conformed to the use of reason in all things, there would be no crime and, therefore, no reason for 
the continuation of government. 
 67. Ashcraft, supra note 38, at 903. Further, “[a]s a state extended over a period of time, the state 
of nature will be both tranquil and violent, though at any given moment, and always because of 
specific social circumstances, it will be either one or the other.” Id.  
 68. Locke “implies, however, that such a person is the exception to the harmonious rule, 
describing him as ‘degenerate,’ and declaring ‘himself to quit the Principles of Human Nature, and to 
be a noxious Creature.’” Snyder, supra note 43, 732. 
 69. Id. 
 70. “For the most part we are reasonably clear as to what a punishment is. We know that 
someone put into prison is being punished. When a child does something wrong, the spanking it 
receives is its punishment. As a first approximation it is natural to say ‘punishment’ means ‘infliction 
of suffering upon wrongdoers.’” Sidney Gendin, The Meaning of “Punishment,” 28 PHIL. & 
PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH 235 (1967). 
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punishment.
71
 However, the act of punishment “is morally troubling 
because it almost always causes human suffering.”72 In Locke’s opinion, 
for punishment to be justified, two things are requisite: “[f]irst, that he 
who does it has commission and power so to do . . . [s]econdly, that it be 
directly useful for the procuring some greater good.”73 These two concerns 
form the basis of Locke’s discussion on punishment in the state of nature. 
Given that governments in civil society are today imbued with the right 
to punish, it is important to understand where that right initiated. Locke, as 
a proponent of natural rights, “wanted to claim that all political authority 
. . . is artificial, and so must be explained it terms of more basic, natural 
forms of authority.”74 Assuming, as Locke did, that government is 
invested with authority through a social contract by which individuals are 
divested of certain individual rights, the government’s right to punish in 
civil society, “like all governmental rights, must be composed of the 
redistributed natural rights of citizens, rights that the citizens must 
therefore have been capable of possessing in a nonpolitical state of 
nature.”75 
Locke, having established that men had a right to punish wrongdoers 
prior to the foundation of civil society, based the right to punish in each 
individual’s interest in self-preservation.76 This focus on self-preservation 
can also be understood as the basis for Locke’s conception of natural 
rights.
77
 Locke’s argument is, then, that the state’s right to punish “stems 
from the right we possess as individuals in the natural condition to defend 
ourselves against the assaults of those who transgress the laws of 
nature.”78 
The theoretical foundation for punishment in the state of nature, and 
therefore punishment in civil society, is that by transgressing the law of 
 
 
 71. “The purpose of a system of punishment is to impose unpleasantness on actual offenders by 
actual authorities.” Don E. Scheid, Note on Defining ‘Punishment,’ 10 CANADIAN J. PHIL. 453 (1980). 
 72. Daniel McDermott, The Permissibility of Punishment, 20 L. & PHIL. 403 (2001). However, 
the “fact that a practice causes suffering is not, of course, enough to conclude that it is morally 
unjustified, but it is enough to make the practice an appropriate object of moral concern.” Id.  
 73. 2 JOHN LOCKE, A Second Letter Concerning Toleration, in THE WORKS OF JOHN LOCKE 281 
(2d ed. 1722). 
 74. Simmons, supra note 27, at 313. Further, “[g]overnments have rights to limit our liberty, for 
instance, only insofar as they have been granted those rights by us[.]” Id. 
 75. Id. at 314. 
 76. “Any duty to punish in the state of nature can for Locke flow only from the much more 
comprehensive duty to ‘preserve mankind’ in oneself and others.” A. John Simmons, Locke on the 
Death Penalty, 69 PHIL. 471, 474 (1994). 
 77. The natural rights espoused by Locke—life, health, liberty, and possessions—all directly 
relate back to an individual’s ability to preserve himself. 
 78. Brian Calvert, Locke on Punishment and the Death Penalty, 68 PHIL. 211, 219 (1993). 
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nature, the offender has put himself outside the protections of the 
community.
79
 By so doing, the offender has also put himself into direct 
conflict with those living according to reason under the law.
80
 By breaking 
the law of nature, others “have no reason to suppose, that he, who would 
take away my liberty, would not, when he had me in his power, take away 
everything else . . . and therefore it is lawful for me to treat him as one 
who has put himself into a state of war with me.”81 The purpose of 
punishment in the state of nature is, therefore, mutual protection through 
the deterrence of similar criminal conduct. 
E. Implementation of Punishment According to Locke 
However, without a civil government capable of effecting such 
punishment, Locke had to devise the means by which such punishment 
could be executed.
82
 In devising such a system, Locke realized that the 
threat of continued criminal activity impacted mankind as a whole.
83
 
Because of this, “every man . . . by the right he hath to preserve mankind 
in general, may restrain, or, where it is necessary, destroy things noxious 
to them, and so may bring such evil on any one, who hath transgressed 
that law.”84 And, because all men in the state of nature are equal, “if any 
 
 
 79. “In transgressing the law of nature, the offender declares himself to live by another rule than 
that of reason and common equity, which is that measure God has set to the actions of men for their 
mutual security; and so he becomes dangerous to mankind, the tie, which is to secure them from injury 
and violence, being slighted and broken by him.” LOCKE, supra note 34, at 103.  
 80. “In Locke’s view, the one who breaks the law has abandoned the rule of reason and adopted 
another rule, that of force and violence; and since this is the rule of wild animals, we are perfectly 
entitled to [punish] those who live by this rule to protect ourselves as well as others.” Calvert, supra 
note 78, at 218–19. 
 81. LOCKE, supra note 34, at 108. 
 82. The lack of a judicial system in the state of nature was one of the driving forces, Locke 
believed, for the foundation of civil governments. “[O]ne can say that Lockean men in the state of 
nature are in an ‘uneasy’ and uncertain condition precisely because of an absent good which they 
desire—namely an impartial, standing judge who can enforce natural law; that these men are moved 
by their uneasiness to make an agreement which institutes civil society and does away with the 
‘inconvenience’ of the state of nature.” Patrick Riley, Locke on ‘Voluntary Agreement’ and Political 
Power, 29 W. POL. Q. 136, 140–41 (1976). 
 83. Crime is “a trespass against the whole species, and the peace and safety of it, provided for by 
the law of nature.” LOCKE, supra note 34, at 103. 
 84. Id. Locke also stated, “every man has a power to punish the crime, to prevent its being 
committed again, ‘by the right he has of preserving all mankind,’ and doing all reasonable things he 
can in order to that end.’” Id. at 104. Further, “[t]he execution of the law of nature is, in that state, put 
into every man’s hands, whereby every one has a right to punish the transgressors of that law.” Id. at 
103. 
 However, “Locke’s position is not really that all persons in the state of nature with respect to 
others have the natural right to punish those others for their crimes. Children (those below the ‘age of 
reason’) do not possess this executive right in spite of being in the state of nature with respect to all 
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one in the state of nature may punish another for any evil he has done, 
every one may do so.”85 In this way, the criminal conduct “leaves the 
criminal morally vulnerable to punishment and so open to anyone who 
wishes to administer just punishment.”86 
The marriage of individually enforced punishment with general 
deterrence has led some critics to suggest that such a system would cause 
the malfeasor “to be battered again and again for a single dereliction,” a 
mode of punishment which goes “far beyond the wildest fantasies of the 
most bloodthirsty retributivist.”87 However, the language employed by 
Locke does not support such a criticism. Locke’s use of the phrases “all 
reasonable things” and “to deter others” suggests that punishment for 
criminal punishment was not intended to be indefinite.
88
 Rather, the text of 
Two Treatises of Government supports the notion that every individual has 
the right to “punish anyone who does wrong until that wrongdoer has 
been punished up to a certain point.”89  
Instead of limitless authority to punish, each individual in the state of 
nature “would have a right to do, to any given wrongdoer, whatever [he] 
reasonably think[s] is necessary in order to keep him from doing wrong 
again and to keep other, potential wrongdoers from acting similarly.”90 
Locke outlines a system of achieving both special and general 
deterrence.
91
 One may not punish an individual merely “according to the 
passionate heats or boundless extravagancy of his own will.”92 Rather, in a 
Lockean state of nature, punishment can only proceed “so far as calm 
 
 
persons. Presumably the same is true of idiots, madmen, warmakers, and any other ‘persons’ who do 
not qualify for Locke as full right-holders.” Simmons, supra note 27, at 319. 
 85. LOCKE, supra note 34, at 103. Locke explained that “for in that state of perfect equality, 
where naturally there is no superiority or jurisdiction of one over another, what any may do in 
prosecution of that law every one must needs have a right to do.” Id.  
 86. Simmons, supra note 76, at 475. 
 87. Daniel M. Farrell, Punishment Without The State, 22 NOÛS 437, 439 (1988) (quoting David 
Lyons, Rights Against Humanity, 85 PHIL. REV. 208, 210 (1976) (reviewing ROBERT NOZICK, 
ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA (1974))).  
 88. The first phrase, “all reasonable things,” can be found in LOCKE, supra note 34, at 104. 
“[E]very man has a power to punish the crime, to prevent its being committed again, ‘by the right he 
has of preserving all mankind,’ and doing all reasonable things he can do in order to that end.” The 
second phrase, “to deter others,” can be found at LOCKE, supra note 34, at 104. “Every man, in the 
state of nature, has a power to [punish a criminal] . . . to deter others from doing the like injury.” 
 89. Farrell, supra note 87, at 439. Further, “even in the state of nature, we would have a right to 
do—to any given wrongdoer—whatever we have to do in order to protect ourselves (and others) from 
future wrongful actions of that particular wrongdoer, and . . . we would also have a right to do—to 
this same wrongdoer—whatever we have to do in order to protect ourselves from other individuals 
who might be inclined to perpetrate a similar sort of wrong.” Id. at 441. 
 90. Id. at 439 (emphasis added). 
 91. Id. 
 92. LOCKE, supra note 34, at 103. 
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reason and conscience dictate” in order to achieve a punishment that “is 
proportionate to [the] transgression.”93 Therefore, “the point up to which a 
wrongdoer may thus be punished, on Locke’s view, is determined by 
considerations that have to do with what is arguably necessary for . . . 
deterrence.”94  
F. Conclusion 
The main components of punishment in a Lockean state of nature are: 
(i) that the offender has negatively impacted another’s life, health, liberty, 
or property; (ii) that, because of this, the offender is dangerous to 
mankind; (iii) that, because he is dangerous, he has opened himself to 
punishment; and (iv) that the punishment exacted should efficiently deter 
similar criminal conduct. By deconstructing the contemporary institutions 
of government and criminal punishment through the use of a state of 
nature, Locke outlines a theory of punishment that protects those most 
basic human rights: the rights to life, health, liberty, and property. Locke 
accomplishes this by focusing punishment on the deterrence of future 
conduct that will negatively impact those inherent rights. 
II. THE FAILURE OF AMERICAN CRIMINAL PUNISHMENT 
The practical purpose of a system of punishment “is to impose 
unpleasantness on actual offenders by actual authorities.”95 The theoretical 
basis of instituting a system of punishment, however, is the limitation of 
criminal conduct.
96
 The harbinger of modern democracy, the United States 
currently boasts the highest rate of incarceration in the world.
97
 The 
criminal justice system in the United States, then, is not serving its 
foundational purpose. 
The failure of the criminal justice system in the United States has been 
a topic of debate and conversation since the earliest days of the Republic.
98
 
 
 
 93. Id. 
 94. Farrell, supra note 87, at 439. 
 95. Scheid, supra note 71, at 459.  
 96. There are three generally recognized bases for systems of criminal punishment: retribution, 
rehabilitation, and deterrence. Each of these is aimed at the limitation of criminal action, though in 
very different ways.  
 97. According to 2011 statistics, the United States of America has the highest prison population 
rate in the world. See Victimless Crime Constitutes 86% of the Federal Prison Population, 
LIBERTARIAN NEWS (Sept. 29, 2011), http://www.libertariannews.org/2011/09/29/victimless-crime-
constitutes-86-of-the-american-prison-population/. 
 98. “The growth of crime in the United States has been viewed as a social problem since the 
founding of the Republic.” Harold E. Pepinsky, The Growth of Crime in the United States, 423 
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It was then that crime statistics were first developed and utilized.
99
 Even at 
the advent of such statistics, commentators in the United States understood 
that 
[i]f it be true that our criminal records exceed that of Europe by 
hundreds of per cent, we surely ought to try to do something about 
it. But we ought first to make an effort to determine whether it is 
true, and what the possible causes are, so as to know just what to do, 
besides indulging in a hysterical and bloodthirsty clamor for a 
return to the penological ideals of 18th-century England.100 
Even now, nearly a century later, the evidence reinforces the theory that 
the United States far exceeds not only European rates of incarceration, but 
also far exceeds the rest of the world by hundreds of percent.
101
 
This elevated rate is especially important given the high cost of crime 
on society.
102
 The true cost of crime is difficult to quantify in part because 
any true measure must include both tangible and intangible losses.
103
 
Beyond the cost to the victim in terms of tangible and intangible losses, 
crime costs society as a whole through the institutions of prosecution and 
punishment.
104
 The cost of crime on society accounts for the assumption 
that lower crime rates are desirable.
105
 
 
 
ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 23 (1976). 
 99. “European concern for and initial development of crime statistics apparently preceded those 
in America. The earliest call for crime statistics . . . was that made in the seventeenth century by an 
Englishman, Sir William Petty. Nationwide crime statistics were first collected in France in 1827.” Id. 
at 24. 
 100. I. M. Rubinow, Suggestions on Crime Statistics, 125 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 
137, 143 (1926). 
 101. Approximately 756 of every 100,000 residents is incarcerated. In other words, 1 of every 42 
Americans is under correctional supervision, over two percent of the entire population. In the rest of 
the world, the average is only 145 out of 100,000. The United States of America incarcerates its 
population at over five times the world average. See supra note 97. 
 102. “The costs of crime and the costs of abating crime represent a huge burden on society, 
although exact estimates of these costs are inherently difficult to pinpoint.” Ziggy MacDonald, Official 
Crime Statistics: Their Use and Interpretation, 112 ECON. J. F85 (2002). 
 103. “Tangible costs of crime refer to the value of lost possessions or of lost work days, for 
example. Intangible costs are defined so as to embody the monetary value of the pain and suffering of 
crime amongst victims.” Giles Atkinson, Andrew Healey & Susana Mourato, Valuing the Costs of 
Violent Crime: A Stated Preference Approach, 57 OXFORD ECON. PAPERS 559, 561 (2005). 
 104. For example, the “cost of building a maximum-security cell ranges from $30,000 to $130,000 
and averages $58,000. The annual cost for maintaining a prisoner is $10,000 to $30,000.” Edward M. 
Kennedy, Prison Overcrowding: The Law’s Dilemma, 478 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 113, 
117 (1985). 
 105. “The assumption that it is desirable to lower rates of crime implicitly if not explicitly 
underlies practically all research and planning in the field of criminal justice.” Pepinsky, supra note 
98, at 29. 
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A. Expansion of Criminal Statutes 
In an attempt to lower the prevalence of crime, American criminal law 
has become exceptionally broad, covering both the heinous and the 
trivial.
106
 The core crimes remain relatively unchanged since the time of 
Blackstone.
107
 However, the number of offenses deemed criminal has risen 
steadily across state jurisdictions since the middle of the nineteenth-
century.
108
 The federal system has experienced similar expansion.
109
 And 
because “all change in criminal law seems to push in the same direction—
toward more liability—this state of affairs is growing worse: legislatures 
regularly add to criminal codes, but rarely subtract from them.”110 The 
culmination of this progression is a comprehensive criminal code that 
covers all individual conduct.
111
 
However, this tendency towards over-criminalization does not account 
for differences in the nature of crime.
112
 Not all crimes have the same 
capacity for harm.
113
 While it is difficult to determine whether one crime is 
of a more serious nature than another, “comparisons are not out of order, 
and the overriding attention given to violent crimes as compared, for 
example, with transport accidents, may be germane to determining the 
relative importance of different types of events in matters of public 
safety.”114 Even so, states across the country maintain felony statutes 
 
 
 106. “American criminal law, federal and state, is very broad; it covers far more conduct than any 
jurisdiction could possibly punish. The federal code alone has thousands of criminal prohibitions 
covering an enormous range of behavior, from the heinous to the trivial. State codes are a little 
narrower, but not much.” William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. 
REV. 505, 507 (2001). 
 107. “The law that defines core crimes derives from the common law of England. Save for auto 
theft, everything in the list of FBI index crimes was a crime in Blackstone’s day.” Id. at 512. 
 108. “Numbers of offenses give some hint of the magnitude of the phenomenon. In 1856, 
Illinois’s criminal code contained 131 separate crimes. In 1874, the number had grown to 220. By 
1899 it was 305; it reached 460 in 1951. . . . And Illinois’s numbers are fairly representative. In the 
past century and a half, Virginia’s criminal code grew from 170 offenses to 495 . . . Massachusetts 
went from 214 crimes . . . to 535.” Id. at 513–14. 
 109. “The past century and a quarter has seen even greater increases in the number of crimes listed 
in the relevant title of the federal code. In the version of the Revised Statutes passed in December 
1873, the title of federal crimes included 183 separate offenses. By 2000, 643 separate sections of Title 
18 of the United States Code defined crimes; since some of those sections defined a number of 
offenses, the number of distinct crimes in Title 18 is almost certainly over one thousand.” Id. at 514. 
 110. Id. at 507. 
 111. “The end point of this progression is clear: criminal codes that cover everything and decide 
nothing.” Id. at 509. 
 112. David E. Sisk, Police Corruption and Criminal Monopoly: Victimless Crimes, 11 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 395, 395–96 (1982). 
 113. Albert J. Reiss, Jr., Public Safety: Marshaling Crime Statistics, 453 ANNALS AM. ACAD. 
POL. & SOC. SCI. 222, 227 (1981).  
 114. Id. at 224. 
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criminalizing trivial and private conduct.
115
 Thus, some of the conduct 
criminalized is not only non-injurious, but also based solely on the 
creation of a risk of future injury.
116
 
The evidence is clear that instead of focusing on violent crime or 
property crime, the expansion of criminal codes in the United States has 
led to the widespread prosecution of victimless crime.
117
 Dissatisfaction 
with this approach is commonplace.
118
 Arguments for the 
decriminalization of victimless crime “are supported by a philosophical 
argument, and it is one with a substantial pedigree.”119 Beyond the liberal 
philosophies of Enlightenment thinkers like Locke, these arguments also 
found substantial support in nineteenth-century utilitarian philosophers 
such as John Stuart Mill.
120
 In both instances, there is general 
disapprobation about the use of government agencies of control, such as 
law enforcement agencies, “to impose constraints on those whose 
behavior, though distasteful, poses no direct threat to the property or 
person of others.”121  
 
 
 115. “Florida criminalizes selling untested sparklers, or altering tested ones; it also bans the 
exhibition of deformed animals. . . . California criminalizes knowingly allowing the carcass of a dead 
animal ‘to be put, or to remain, within 100 feet of any street, alley, public highway, or road . . . .’ It 
also criminalizes the sale of alcohol to an ‘common drunkard’ and cheating at cards. Ohio criminalizes 
homosexual propositions and ‘ethnic intimidation.’ Texas criminalizes overworking animals, causing 
two dogs to fight, and violation of rules concerning recruitment of college athletes. Massachusetts 
criminally punishes frightening pigeons away from ‘beds which have been made for the purpose of 
taking them in nets.’” Stuntz, supra note 106, at 515–16. 
 116. “A number of states criminalize negligent assault, which amounts to nothing more than an 
ordinary tort. Some states go farther, criminalizing negligent endangerment, which requires neither 
injury nor the materialization of risk, but only risk creation. Possession of burglars’ tools, which may 
mean no more than possession of a screwdriver, is routinely criminalized, as is possession of various 
sorts of ‘drug paraphernalia’ . . . other than the banned drugs themselves.” Id. at 516. 
 117. There is no perfect statistic for measuring crime for a number of reasons. First, “[e]vents that 
fall within the scope of the criminal law are classified as crimes whether or not they actually are 
completed. Attempts to commit a crime are considered crimes as well as those completed . . . . It 
seems misleading, however, to term both attempted and actual crimes as ‘crimes’ for purposes of 
public reporting . . . .” Reiss, supra note 113, at 226.  
 Further, not all incidents of crime are reported to the police. “Demographic factors are likely to 
influence reporting behavior” with “individuals in higher income groups, particularly older people . . . 
are far more likely to report an incident.” MacDonald, supra note 102, at F96. 
 118. “Although it may have been controversial when first advanced, the claim that victimless 
crimes should be decriminalized now commands widespread support.” Alan Wertheimer, Victimless 
Crimes, 87 ETHICS 302 (1977). 
 119. Id. 
 120. “The arguments generally follow Mill’s claim that ‘the sole end for which mankind are 
warranted . . . in interfering with the liberty of action of any of their number is self-protection.’” Id. at 
303 (quoting JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 13 (Liberal Arts Press 1956) (1859)). 
 121. Ronald Bayer, Heroin Decriminalization and the Ideology of Tolerance: A Critical View, 12 
L. & SOC. REV. 301, 309 (1978). 
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B. Victimless Crime 
There are a number of conceptions of what exactly constitutes a 
victimless crime.
122
 Generally, the term “victimless crime” refers to “a 
large number of offenses against morals in which there are no victims, 
such as gambling, consumption of liquor or homosexuality whose 
characteristic feature is that . . . the persons affected are those who take 
part in the act of their own free will and are responsible for the suffering 
which is self-inflicted.”123 In the case of a victimless crime, there is no 
individual seeking reparation from a public authority.
124
 Instead of an 
injured individual, “it is the public authority which is offended against and 
which must seek out the transgressor.”125 
This antagonistic relationship between private citizen and government 
also raises significant privacy concerns.
126
 An individual citizen’s 
constitutional right to privacy has been recognized by the United States 
Supreme Court.
127
 This is an important consideration because, unlike cases 
involving a complaining witness, it is difficult for the government to 
acquire evidence or establish guilt of a victimless crime without affecting 
an individual’s privacy.128 “Any society that seeks to stamp out drugs, or 
gambling, or alcohol, or any other sort of behavior that involves 
consensual transactions, requires law enforcement that is proactive.”129 
 
 
 122. “One account argues that victimless activities are those in which no one is harmed, or if harm 
is done, it is ‘primarily harm to the participating individuals themselves.’ A second account . . . argues 
that victimless crimes are those which involve ‘a willing and private exchange of strongly demanded 
yet officially proscribed goods and services; this element of consent precludes the existence of a 
victim.’ A third account argues that victimless activities are those that ‘do not result in anyone’s 
feeling that he has been injured so as to impel him to bring the offense to the attention of the 
authorities.’” Wertheimer, supra note 118, at 305. 
 123. S. R. Sankaran, Police Reforms: Need to Review Power to Arrest, 35 ECON. & POL. WKLY. 
4082, 4083 (2000). 
 124. Bayer, supra note 121, at 312. 
 125. Id. Further, it is this that “has led Edwin Schur to argue that the effort to enforce such norms 
involves an effort to ‘legislate morality for its own sake.’” Id. 
 126. While the United States Constitution does not explicitly recognize a right to privacy, as early 
as 1890 “Warren and Brandeis identified privacy—which they defined, in overbroad but meaningful 
terms, as the right ‘to be let alone’—as a significant value that deserved, and indeed had to a large 
extent received, legal protection by the courts.” Louis Lusky, Invasion of Privacy: A Clarification of 
Concepts, 87 POL. SCI. Q. 192 (1972). 
 127. “In 1965, five members of the United States Supreme Court . . . extrapolating from the 
several Bill of Rights safeguards of particular aspects of privacy . . . postulated the existence of a 
general right of privacy which the Constitution itself protects.” Id.  
 128. Cark F. Cranor, Legal Moralism Reconsidered, 89 ETHICS 147, 161 (1979). “In addition, for 
those ‘crimes’ that are necessarily committed in private it is impossible to have evidence of violation 
without infringing the right to privacy.” Id.  
 129. Stuntz, supra note 106, at 581–82. 
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Such a system requires law enforcement agencies to search for crime.
130
 
And, crucially, “[w]here they look determines what kinds of arrests they 
make . . . .”131 
A consideration of the crime of possession is illustrative. The 
possession of drugs and guns operates as possession qua possession—a 
violation in itself.
132
 It is an offense that law enforcement officials actively 
search out: “[e]very physical or merely visual search, every frisk, every 
patdown, is always a search for possession.”133 Because of the ease of 
access, possession “has become the paradigmatic offense in the current 
campaign to stamp out crime by incapacitating as many criminals as [the 
criminal system] can get [its] hands on.”134 And possession statutes have 
allowed the criminal system to get its hands on an enormous number of 
individuals.
135
 As possession is a regulatory offense, in that, like speeding, 
it includes no mens rea requirement, the vast majority of defendants plead 
guilty.
136
 Taken together, this means that possession crimes, which are 
inherently victimless, have become the most expedient entrance into the 
criminal justice system in the United States.
137
 
C. Recidivism 
Instead of minimizing crime, these “‘net widening’ policies may 
actually exacerbate the crime problem on a larger scale.”138 Such policies 
are criminogenic, meaning they are likely to cause further criminal 
behavior.
139
 This is known as the “revolving door” effect, where 
individuals, once incarcerated, engage in a “never ending cycle of jail, 
release without treatment, and jail again.”140  
 
 
 130. Id.  
 131. Id. at 582. 
 132. Markus Dirk Dubber, Policing Possession: The War on Crime and the End of Criminal Law, 
91 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 829, 855 (2001). 
 133. Id. at 857. 
 134. Id. at 859. 
 135. For instance, in 1998, “possession offenses accounted for 106,565, or 17.9%, of all arrests 
made in New York State.” Id.  
 136. Of 106,565 possession offenses in New York State in 1998, only 295, or 0.27% resulted in a 
verdict, and only 129, or 0.12%, in an acquittal. Id.  
 137. Id. at 856. 
 138. Robert Apel & Gary Sweeten, The Impact of Incarceration on Employment during the 
Transition to Adulthood, 57 SOC. PROBS. 448 (2010). 
 139. Sankaran, supra note 123, at 4082. 
 140. Ronald W. Fagan & Armand L. Mauss, Padding the Revolving Door: An Initial Assessment 
of the Uniform Alcoholism and Intoxication Treatment Act in Practice, 26 SOC. PROBS. 232 (1978). 
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There is evidence that regularly paying employment serves as an 
enhancement to the deterrent effect of legal punishment.
141
 However, 
incarceration significantly lowers the likelihood of such employment.
142
 
This issue is exacerbated when populations of similarly situated 
individuals are concentrated in a specific community.
143
 Cumulatively, 
these policies lead to the concentration of convicted individuals within 
specific communities and to the deterioration of social constructs likely to 
prevent further incarceration, which makes the cost of commencing a 
second criminal action much lower than the first.
144
 
A study of state recidivism rates shows the inefficacy of net-widening 
policies on preventing crime.
145
 In 2012, the State of California completed 
a study on recidivism.
146
 The study showed that, of inmates released from 
the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation in the 2007-
2008 fiscal year, over sixty-percent were re-incarcerated within three 
years.
147
 Put into more concrete terms, 73,885 individuals released from 
state correctional facilities were back under state correctional control 
within three years.
148
 Additionally, the data showed that individuals who 
 
 
 141. “Research shows individuals with regularized paying jobs have commitments that enhance 
the deterrent effect of formal legal sanctions. However . . . a sustained decline in wages for unskilled 
workers has weakened both attachments to work and incentives to participate.” Tracey L. Meares, 
Neal Katyal & Dan M. Kahan, Updating the Study of Punishment, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1171, 1187 
(2004). 
 142. “[I]mprisonment serves as a ‘signal’ to potential employers about what kind of employee one 
is likely to be. Such a signal constitutes a social stigma because it is associated with perceived 
productivity costs on the part of the employer. Specifically, incarceration may impose reputational 
losses on offenders, as well as enact structural barriers that impede successful reintegration into the 
community. Potential employers may perceive ex-inmates as bad employees who are not worth the 
risk of hiring for a variety of reasons.” Apel & Sweeten, supra note 138, at 451. 
 143. “Specifically, when punishment is heaped on a class of offenders that is not geographically 
dispersed but that is instead spatially concentrated, as is the class of low-level drug retailers, it is 
possible that the policy confounds its own crime-fighting ends by fueling the precursors to social 
organization disruption, such as family disruption, unemployment, and low economic status.” Meares, 
Katyal & Kahan, supra note 141, at 1191.  
 144. Id. at 1179. 
 145. “Recidivism, in a criminal justice context, can be defined as the reversion of an individual to 
criminal behavior after he or she has been convicted of a prior offense, sentenced, and (presumably) 
corrected.” Raymond Ellermann, Pasquale Sullo & James M. Tien, An Alternative Approach to 
Modeling Recidivism Using Quantile Residual Life Functions, 40 OPERATIONS RESEARCH 485 (1992) 
(quoting M.D. MALTZ, RECIDIVISM 1 (1984)). Many jurisdictions measure recidivism at the one, two, 
and three-year intervals of release. 
 146. See California Dep’t of Corrections and Rehabilitation, 2012 Outcome Evaluation Report 
(2012), available at http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/adult_research_branch/Research_Documents/ARB_FY_ 
0708_Recidivism_Report_10.23.12.pdf (last visited Apr. 30, 2015). 
 147. Id. at 13. 
 148. Id. at 14. 
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had been incarcerated two or more times were approximately twenty-
percent more likely to end up in custody again.
149
  
When considered in conjunction with a study of federal prison 
recidivism, the numbers are particularly instructional. In line with the 
states, the majority of federal prisoners are convicted of victimless 
crimes.
150
 Among this group, the recidivism rate is roughly twenty 
percent.
151
 However, further analysis “shows that when reason for failure 
is considered, none of the . . . low-risk drug traffickers who recidivated 
were charged with serious crimes of violence such as found in the [Federal 
Bureau of Investigation Uniform Crime Reporting] violent crime 
index.”152 Half of the individuals were rearrested for drug offenses, 
twelve-percent for driving while intoxicated, and nearly twenty-percent for 
parole violations or miscellaneous non-violent offenses.
153
 This is 
substantial, factual data of the revolving door theory in practice, where 
“the alienation, deteriorated family relations, and reduced employment 
prospects resulting from the extremely long removal from family and 
regular employment” increases the rate of recidivism among non-violent 
offenders.
154
 
D. Conclusion 
The United States is facing a crisis in its criminal justice system. The 
national trend is to expand both the punishable offenses and the length of 
punishment. However, by punishing the perpetrators of victimless crimes 
with significant prison time, the United States is merely perpetuating the 
problem. These offenders, who pose little or no threat of violence, are 
entrapped in a system of repeated incarceration and punishment for 
consensual activities. The United States must begin to take reasonable 
steps to provide for the reintroduction of these non-violent offenders into 
society if the revolving door is to finally be stopped.  
 
 
 149. Id. at 13. 
 150. “[D]rug traffickers . . . compose the largest single federal prison offense group, both among 
admissions and population on hand—as of June 1, 1993, 61 percent of all federal prisoners were drug 
traffickers. Of the 27,525 persons sentenced to Federal prison in 1992, 14,293, or 52 percent, were 
convicted of drug trafficking . . . .” Miles D. Harer, Do Guideline Sentences for Low-Risk Drug 
Traffickers Achieve Their Stated Purposes?, 7 FED. SENT’G REP. 22 (1994). 
 151. “[A]mong low-risk drug traffickers, 19.1 percent recidivated and 80.9 percent did not.” Id.  
 152. Id.  
 153. Id.  
 154. Id. at 23. 
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III. LOOKING TO LOCKE FOR SOLUTIONS 
Though the United States has undeniable flaws in its system of 
criminal punishment, a few changes can bring the system in line with the 
theory of punishment outlined in Locke’s state of nature. The high rate of 
incarceration has put enormous stress on the prison system in the United 
States. In fact, the “inadequacy of existing prison facilities in the United 
States is playing an increasingly prominent role in the debate over how to 
improve law enforcement and reduce crime.”155 With increasing public 
outcry for stricter punishment, especially in the form of incarceration, the 
criminal systems of the United States, because of their limited budgets, 
must look to new means of punishment.
156
 
Among the possible changes are: (a) focusing punishment on 
deterrence theory; (b) the decriminalization of victimless crime; (c) greater 
individualization in punishment by minimizing plea bargaining, increased 
victim input, greater judicial discretion, or allowing jury nullification; and 
(d) focusing on reintegrating convicted individuals into the community 
after incarceration. Each of these changes is consistent with the philosophy 
of John Locke and would have a positive impact on the substantial 
problems facing the American system of criminal punishment as outlined 
in Part II. 
A. Deterrence Theory 
The underlying theory of punishment in the Lockean state of nature is 
the deterrence of future crime.
157
 In fact, Locke argued that each crime 
may only be “punished to that degree, and with so much severity, as will 
suffice to make it an ill bargain to the offender, give him cause to repent, 
and terrify others from doing the like.”158 The central concept of 
deterrence is that “the threat that the unpleasant consequences which result 
from breaking the law will serve to discourage criminal activities . . . .”159 
Deterrence theory suggests the more severe the penalty, the higher the rate 
of compliance will be with a given statute.
160
 
 
 
 155. Kennedy, supra note 104, at 114. 
 156. Id.  
 157. “[E]very man has a power to punish the crime, to prevent its being committed again, ‘by the 
right he has of preserving all mankind,’ and doing all reasonable things he can do in order to that end.” 
LOCKE, supra note 34, at 104 (emphasis added). 
 158. LOCKE, supra note 34, at 105. 
 159. Patricia G. Erickson, Deterrence and Deviance: The Example of Cannabis Prohibition, 67 J. 
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 222 (1976).  
 160. “Deterrence theory suggests that those given the more severe penalties would be least likely 
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In general, “[s]anctions such as imprisonment impose high personal 
opportunity costs, and thus potentially represent a greater deterrent 
. . . .”161 However, at least in terms of victimless crimes, this does not 
appear to be accurate.
162
 Indeed, there is substantial evidence “that law 
enforcement will not work to curb demand substantially no matter how 
many police and judges are hired, or arrests made, or prisons built.”163 The 
percentage of individuals convicted of victimless crimes, discussed in Part 
II shows that the fear of incarceration is not substantial enough to deter 
certain criminal conduct. 
Instead of continually increasing prison sentences for victimless 
crimes, a course of action that has put substantial strain on the criminal 
justice system, jurisdictions can craft punishments that better deter 
criminal action. Other possible sanctions include economic sanction—
such as a fine—for low-level drug dealers, and medical treatment for drug 
users. In both cases, these punishments target the reason for continued 
activity, the economic advantage for drug dealers in operating an 
underground illicit market, and, for users, the continual need to purchase 
narcotics. 
B. The Decriminalization of Victimless Crime 
As outlined in Part I, Locke’s conception of crime in the state of nature 
centers on an individual’s right to life, health, liberty, and property.164 
Without these rights, crime is not possible. And, as outlined in Part II, 
American legislators have grossly over-criminalized individual action.
165
 
One possible solution to the crisis in criminal punishment is, then, 
decriminalization.  
While there are a number of definitions for the term 
“decriminalization,” each attempts to examine “the appropriate role of the 
state in regulating the behavior of competent adults . . . .”166  
 
 
to continue the proscribed behavior.” Id. at 226. 
 161. Roger Bowles, Michael Faure & Nuno Garoupa, The Scope of Criminal Law and Criminal 
Sanctions: An Economic View and Policy Implications, 35 J. L. & SOC’Y. 389, 398 (2008). 
 162. “Criminal sanctions neither deter drunkenness nor prevent recidivism.” Fagan & Mauss, 
supra note 140, at 234. 
 163. Morris J. Blachman & Kenneth E. Sharpe, The War on Drugs: American Democracy under 
Assault, 7 WORLD POL’Y J. 135, 137 (1989). 
 164. LOCKE, supra note 34, at 111. 
 165. Stuntz, supra note 106, at 515–16. 
 166. Ronald Bayer, Introduction: The Great Drug Policy Debate: What Means This Thing Called 
Decriminalization?, 69 MILBANK Q. 341, 360 (1991). 
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“Although it may have been controversial when first advanced, the 
claim that victimless crimes should be decriminalized now commands 
widespread support.”167 Beyond merely academics, this theory has 
received widespread support among experts in criminology and law 
enforcement.
168
  
Decriminalization is an attractive option. However, the politics of 
modern America, a two-party system in which each clamors for the 
“tough-on-crime” moniker, make such a shift in theory unlikely. There 
are, though, a number of practical limited options for decriminalization. 
First, the overlap of crime between various levels of government could be 
eliminated. While this would not effect a decriminalization of activity, it 
would have a substantial impact on possible sentencing. Second, 
legislators, both state and federal, could wade through the expanse of 
criminal statutes and work to decriminalize those that are impractical or 
rarely utilized. Such an effort would increase the gravity of the criminal 
system, which could, in turn, reduce the incidence of criminal activity.  
C. Individualization of Criminal Sanctions 
1. Plea Bargaining 
Plea-bargaining occurs when “rational parties forecast the expected 
trial outcome and strike bargains that leave both sides better off by 
splitting the saved costs of trial.”169 Plea bargains occur in the majority of 
cases; the vast majority when it comes to victimless crime.
170
 These 
bargains often skew the allocation of punishment, especially when 
considered together with the over-criminalization outlined in Part II.
171
 
 
 
 167. Wertheimer, supra note 118, at 302. Further, “With some minor variations, the advocates of 
decriminalization would generally recommend that the following activities be removed from the 
province of the criminal law: homosexual relations between consenting adults, adultery, public 
drunkenness, vagrancy, loitering, gambling, prostitution, abortion, and possession and use of 
narcotics.” Id.  
 168. “It has been considered by seasoned administrators that there is an overreach of criminal laws 
and criminal penalties have been applied to a wide and varied range of activities from regulation of 
automobile traffic to anti-terrorist laws. It is strongly felt by many criminologists and law enforcement 
experts that criminal laws should be reviewed with the object of decriminalising many aspects of 
human behaviour.” Sankaran, supra note 123, at 4083. 
 169. Stephanos Bibas, Plea Bargaining Outside the Shadow of Trial, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2463, 
2464 (2004). 
 170. “Of 106,565 possession offenses in New York State in 1998 only 295, or 0.27% resulted in a 
verdict.” Dubber, supra note 132, at 859. 
 171. Bibas, supra note 169, at 2467.  
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Plea-bargaining, then, “adds another layer of distortions that warp the fair 
allocation of punishment.”172  
There are benefits to plea bargains, notably lowering the cost of trial 
procedures. However, if this lowering of trial costs results in a higher 
percentage of incarcerated individuals, that benefit is negated due to the 
high per-inmate cost of upkeep. Plea-bargaining appears focused on short-
term, rather than long-term, system efficiency. A better system would limit 
plea bargains in a number of significant ways. First, prosecutors should 
not be allowed to threaten further prosecution in order to achieve a plea. 
The vast number of criminal statutes, as outlined above, tilts bargaining 
power too far in favor of the government. Second, bargaining proceedings 
should be recorded. This would allow interested victims, community or 
individual, a way to maintain involvement in the process. 
2. Victim Input 
The victim played an important role in punishment in Lockean theory. 
Not only was the victim actually injured, but the victim was also allowed 
to actively participate in punishment of the wrongdoer. This reflected the 
victim’s role at common law.  
While victims historically had rights regarding prosecution and 
punishment, in modern criminal law, victims are almost entirely excluded 
from the process.
173
 People, victimized individuals and communities, 
“value remorse and apology because they heal psychic wounds, teach 
lessons, and reconcile damaged relationships.”174 However, the criminal 
system as currently constructed does not afford a large role to victims.
175
 
In fact, the “genuinely remorseful offender who wishes to apologize to his 
victim and make amends usually has no readily available way to do so. . . . 
 
 
 172. Id. at 2468. “Rather than basing sentences on the need for deterrence, retribution, 
incapacitation, or rehabilitation, plea bargaining effectively bases sentences in part on wealth, sex, age, 
education, intelligence, and confidence.” Id. 
 173. “[O]ur governments allowed the criminal justice pendulum to swing too far in the direction 
of the State. Systematically, the victim was silenced. Aside from testifying at trial (assuming that there 
would be one), victims were often excluded. Victims had no right to consult with prosecutors, no 
ability to recommend a sentence, and often, no right to be present at trial. Moreover, law students 
trained in the criminal law were and still are taught that a crime is an offense against the State.” Erin 
Ann O’Hara, Victims and Prison Release: A Modest Proposal, 19 FED. SENT’G REP. 130, 130 (2006). 
 174. Stephanos Bibas & Richard A. Bierschbach, Integrating Remorse and Apology into Criminal 
Procedure, 114 YALE L.J. 85, 87 (2004). 
 175. “Surprisingly, however, remorse and apology play little role in criminal procedure.” Id. at 88. 
Further, “criminal procedure does little to encourage or even allow meaningful apologies and 
expressions of remorse from offenders to their victims and the community.” Id. at 92. 
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[F]rom the time of arrest until trial (if there is one) and sentencing, victims 
are almost never in sight of the offender.”176 
However, there is currently a greater trend toward victim involvement, 
and apology in particular. One interesting recent innovation is victim-
offender mediation. Studies have shown that such mediation is 
surprisingly successful.
177
 “[E]mperical studies of restorative justice 
programs show that they control crime at least as well, if not better than, 
traditional criminal justice” while also bringing “the added benefits of 
vindicating victims, healing and reconciling victims and offenders, 
reaffirming social norms, and morally educating offenders and citizens.”178 
These benefits can have a great impact on an offender who is conscious of 
wrongdoing.
179
 
The evidence bears this out. “[P]reliminary evidence involving 
juveniles indicates that those offenders who participate in [victim-offender 
mediation] are significantly less likely to recidivate than those who 
participate in the criminal justice process.”180 This is likely due, at least in 
part, to the humanizing nature of face-to-face interaction, which breaks 
down “pride, fear, pain, anxiety, and other barriers to accepting 
responsibility.”181 
Apology and victim-offender mediation will not always be 
successful.
182
 Targeting specific victims and offenders can raise the level 
of success. First, the victim must be willing to confront the offender. And, 
as importantly, the offender must not already be caught in the revolving 
door of criminal life. A mediation and apology system focused on 
 
 
 176. Id. at 97. 
 177. “One study of mediations at four dispute resolution sites in four different states found that 90 
percent of victims and 91 percent of offenders reported being satisfied with the mediation outcome.” 
O’Hara, supra note 173, at 131.  
 178. Bibas & Bierschbach, supra note 174, at 117. 
 179. “A person who is conscious of having done wrong, and who feels genuine remorse for his 
wrong . . . is on the way to developing those internal checks that would keep many people from 
committing crimes even if the expected costs of criminal punishment were lower than they are.” Id. at 
95 (quoting United States v. Beserra, 967 F.2d 254, 256 (7th Cir. 1992) (Posner, J.)) 
 180. O’Hara, supra note 173, at 131. 
 181. Bibas & Bierschbach, supra note 174, at 115. Further, a wrongdoer “cannot simply 
rationalize the crime as being minor or harmless when a real person stands in front of him describing 
the physical and emotional pain directly flowing from his behavior.” Id. (quoting Erik Luna, 
Punishment Theory, Holism, and the Procedural Conception of Restorative Justice, 2003 UTAH L. 
REV. 205, 300).  
 182. “[R]emorse and apology will not always work. Some offenders will remain defiant. Some 
suffer from psychopathy, which impairs the capacity to empathize and so feel remorse. Some victims 
will be rationally or irrationally fearful of meeting with their offenders and reliving the trauma. And 
some—although surprisingly few—may care little about such expressions and may want only 
vengeance.” Id. at 145. 
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juveniles and first-time offenders, if implemented, could have a drastic 
impact on crime in the United States. 
3. Judicial Discretion 
Another way to affect change would be through the widening of 
judicial discretion. “Sentencing is the point in the criminal justice system 
where overcrowding can most effectively be controlled.”183 However, the 
current sentencing practices in the United States of America are a major 
contributing factor to the issue of overcrowding.
184
 “Different judges use 
their unfettered discretion to impose widely different sentences on 
offenders in similar circumstances convicted of similar crimes.”185  
Reforming sentencing laws could establish a uniform policy that would 
limit incarceration and would reserve imprisonment only for offenders 
where the incapacitation is worth the high price.
186
 This reform could be 
accomplished through selective incapacitation, “under which incarceration 
would be reserved primarily for offenders who are a danger to the 
community.”187 This, too, would limit the applicable punishment of 
victimless crime. 
Such a system would allow for judges to liberally use their sentencing 
authority to craft punishments that more adequately reflect the danger 
posed to society by the crime. This would add “a human element to an 
otherwise mechanical process and also provide[] the flexibility necessary 
to adapt rigid, formal rules to diverse, concrete situations.”188 This 
flexibility would allow a sentencing judge to take into account a multitude 
of factors necessary to determine the degree of culpability, including:  
(a) the extent to which an act is antisocial, (b) how far it was 
impulsive or premeditated, (c) the degree of intelligent 
comprehension of its implications and consequences by the 
delinquent, (d) the extent of his insight into his motives, and (e) the 
magnitude of his offense on an objective scale of values. If 
 
 
 183. Kennedy, supra note 104, at 118. 
 184. Id.  
 185. Id.  
 186. Id. at 114. 
 187. Id. at 115. 
 188. Victor H. Li, Law and Penology: Systems of Reform and Correction, 31 PROC. ACAD. POL. 
SCI. 144, 147 (1973). 
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punishment is to be appropriate to an offense, it must be adjusted in 
respect to all these points.189 
Judges should be allowed to exercise discretion in sentencing. A number 
of alternatives to incarceration exist, such as the victim-offender mediation 
outlined above. Especially when dealing with first-time offenders, 
victimless offenders, and juvenile offenders, judges should attempt to 
avoid incarceration whenever possible. By so doing, judges can avoid 
placing individuals within the revolving door of state punishment. 
4. Jury Nullification 
If judicial discretion is not an attractive option, jurisdictions could 
revert to jury nullification to cause a similar end. A vital aspect of 
punishment in a Lockean state of nature was the open condemnation of the 
community. This is evidenced by Locke’s belief that every individual had 
a right, and even a duty, to participate in punishment. Not only did the 
community judge an individual’s guilt or innocence, but the community 
also determined the extent of punishment.  
Trial by jury in criminal cases is one of the important rights guaranteed 
by the United States Constitution.
190
 However, the role the jury plays in 
trial has changed significantly since the eighteenth century when “it was 
commonly accepted that a defendant had the right to a jury which both 
found facts and determined whether the law should apply.”191 Importantly, 
the jury was, more than a trier of fact, a conscience of the community.
192
 
Today, however, most juries only decide guilt and innocence, while a 
judge doles out punishment. One way to reverse this trend and put 
punishment back into the control of the community, as represented by the 
jury, is through jury nullification. Jury nullification allows the jury to find 
a defendant guilty, but to refuse to impose the statutorily enumerated 
punishment when it contradicts the community’s belief.  
Re-implementing some form of jury nullification would allow 
community members greater discretion in sentencing. In victimless 
crimes, where it is the community that has allegedly been wronged, this 
 
 
 189. R. W. Pickford, Psychological Aspects of Punishment, 58 ETHICS 1, 5 (1947). 
 190. “Of the rights guaranteed to the people by the Constitution, only one appears in both the 
original Constitution and the Bill of Rights: the right to a jury trial in criminal cases. While almost all 
other aspects of the Constitution were heavily debated, the Founders did not question the wisdom of 
the jury trial.” Arie M. Rubenstein, Verdicts of Conscience: Nullification and the Modern Jury Trial, 
106 COLUM. L. REV. 959 (2006). 
 191. Id. at 959–60. 
 192. Id. at 992. 
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system could prove valuable in tailoring punishment. Some commentators 
have argued that a return to jury nullification would prove too big a shift 
to be practical, but the evidence suggests otherwise. Jury nullification is 
rooted in the common law, and lasted into the nineteenth century. In fact, 
Maryland still explicitly allows jury nullification.
193
 An increase in jury 
control is a practical and achievable means to minimizing the issues facing 
the American criminal system. 
D. Reintegration 
Whether criminal sanctions are changed to focus on deterrence, 
decriminalization, or individualization, the criminal justice system in the 
United States must also place a greater emphasis on the reintegration of 
convicted individuals into society. Locke argued as much when he said 
that individuals could only be punished up to a certain degree of 
severity.
194
 Criminal punishment in the state of nature was not indefinite. 
As has been evidenced, after release “the offender carries a social 
stigma, generally has learned no socially useful skills, and usually returns 
to the milieu where he first developed his deviant tendencies.”195 
Furthermore, in many instances, a convicted individual must pay for his or 
her crime indefinitely, such as with his or her constitutional rights to vote 
or to own firearms. Without the opportunity to reintegrate into society, all 
incentives to reform an individual’s actions are of a negative character.196 
Criminal justice systems could, then, focus attention on the 
reintegration of released individuals. This could take the form of 
assistance finding stable housing and jobs, in particular. Less likely, but 
with a higher upside for positive change, would be trade training for 
incarcerated individuals. By teaching inmates a craft or skill that is 
transferrable to life outside of prison, the criminal justice system could set 
individuals up for a more successful role in society after release. These 
steps would significantly lower the rate of recidivism by giving released 
individuals an actual opportunity to start anew.   
 
 
 193. “Maryland, whose constitution explicitly permits jury nullification, prescribes a jury 
instruction that states that the law ‘is not binding upon you as members of the jury and you may accept 
or reject it.’” Id. at 990 (quoting Wyley v. Warden, 372 F.2d 742, 743 n.1 (4th Cir. 1967)). 
 194. See LOCKE, supra note 34, at 105. 
 195. Li, supra note 188, at 149. 
 196. Id. at 156. 
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CONCLUSION 
Whatever method used, whether it be an overall rethinking of the 
criminal justice system to focus on deterrence, decriminalizing victimless 
crime, individualizing sentencing, or focusing on reintegration, the 
criminal justice system in the United States is in desperate need of change. 
By looking to the philosophy of John Locke, in particular his theories 
regarding punishment within the state of nature, policy-makers in the 
United States can begin to think critically about how to solve the 
enormous problems of an elevated rate of incarceration, high recidivism, 
and the strain that these two problems put on the finances of local, state, 
and the federal government. 
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